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It is widely recognised today that the Bretton Woods institu-tions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank—need to be substantially reformed to better refl ect 
the economic weight and development priorities of emerging 
powers such as China, India and Brazil. What is often forgot-
ten is the role these countries played in creating these institu-
tions in the fi rst place. In this article, I tell the Indian dimen-
sions of this neglected story, with a special focus on the impor-
tant role that Indians played in pushing for development issues 
to be prioritised at the famous Bretton Woods conference of 
July 1944. 
The analysis is designed to help correct two common mis-
conceptions about the origins of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
The fi rst is that the negotiations were primarily an Anglo–
American affair in which developing countries had little input. 
The second is that international development issues were 
largely ignored during the Bretton Woods negotiations. Both 
assumptions are fl awed as this examination of India’s role 
helps to show. Understanding the history of the birth of the 
Bretton Woods institutions in a more accurate way provides a 
useful perspective for contemporary debates about their future.
Common Misconceptions
The conventional wisdom about Bretton Woods was established 
early on in Richard Gardner’s pioneering book Sterling–Dollar 
Diplomacy, fi rst published in 1956. As his title made clear, 
Gardner saw the creation of the Bretton Woods system as a 
product mainly of Anglo–American diplomacy. That perspec-
tive has been repeated in much subsequent literature, includ-
ing Benn Steil’s recent The Battle of Bretton Woods, which 
focuses very heavily on the roles of Harry Dexter White and 
John Maynard Keynes, the lead US and British negotiators. 
Indeed, Steil (2013: 6) even suggests at one point that “other 
than the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, few 
delegations [at the Bretton Woods conference] came equipped 
to make intellectual contributions to the architecture of the 
fund or the bank.” 
There were, however, 42 other governments represented at 
Bretton Woods beyond those of the US and the UK, and the 
newly published detailed transcripts of the conference make 
clear that many of them participated very actively and made key 
contributions to the discussions (Schuler and Rosenberg 2012; 
see also Conway 2014; Helleiner 2014). Recent scholarship has 
also highlighted how many of the “other 42” were involved in 
consultations with Anglo–American offi cials in advance of the 
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July 1944 conference, in some cases dating back as far as 1942. 
Some even prepared detailed plans of their own for the post-
war international fi nancial order that were shared with others 
in advance of the Bretton Woods meeting (Helleiner 2014). 
The role of developing countries in the negotiations has been 
particularly neglected in much past scholarship. Representative 
of the common view are the comments of Gerald Meier (1984: 9)
Most of the developing countries were still colonies, and only a rela-
tively few, mainly independent nations of Latin America, were invited. 
The political power lay with the United States and Britain, and from 
the outset it was apparent that issues of development were not to be on 
the Bretton Woods agenda.
However, a large majority of delegations at the Bretton 
Woods conference were from poorer  regions of world and 
many were deeply engaged with the negotiations. Particularly 
important were Latin American countries whose 19 delega-
tions to Bretton Woods comprised almost half of those present 
at the meeting. Newly uncovered archival evidence shows how 
the Bretton Woods outcomes were shaped in part by US–Latin 
American fi nancial relations dating back to the late 1930s. Also 
highly involved was the Chinese government, which not only 
prepared a fully-fl edged alternative to the Keynes and White 
plans in the summer of 1943 but also sent the second largest 
delegation to the Bretton Woods meeting itself (more than 
twice the size of the UK’s and smaller only than that of the host 
country) (Helleiner 2014). 
This article focuses on India’s participation in Bretton 
Woods. In most general histories of Bretton Woods, India’s role 
receives little serious attention. Scholars often mention its 
 unsuccessful effort to secure a larger quota and voting power 
within the Bretton Woods institutions. Also sometimes 
 analysed are the failed efforts of Indian offi cials to request 
that India’s “sterling balances”—that had accumulated during 
the war in London as frozen funds—be liquidated multilater-
ally by the new IMF. But India’s participation went well beyond 
those specifi c issues. Drawing on new archival material, the 
recently published transcripts of the meetings, and important 
previous work by India specialists (especially Simha 1970: 
ch 14; Chandavarkar 1989: ch 6, 2001; Mukherjee 2002: 161–
72), I highlight in this article India’s important role in advocat-
ing the prioritisation of international development issues in 
plans for the post-war international fi nancial order.
This role deserves attention because of a second misconcep-
tion about Bretton Woods negotiations—that they largely 
ignored development issues. Meier’s comments above—sug-
gesting that development issues were off the agenda—are 
typical of the conventional wisdom on the topic. Indeed, Meier 
(1984: 9) argues that the disinterest in development issues 
extended beyond the US and British offi cials to include even 
developing country offi cials,
At Bretton Woods, the developing countries tended to view them-
selves more as new, raw-material-producing nations and less as coun-
tries with general development problems. Comprehensive strategies 
of development and policies to accelerate national development were 
yet to be identifi ed.
Gardner makes some similar points, arguing that the question of 
how to assist the development of poorer countries “was not 
recognised as a major issue in the postwar planning.” He even 
dismisses the signifi cance of the creation of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)—the origi-
nal name for the World Bank—arguing that it was initially 
“conceived mainly as an institution for reconstruction” rather 
than development (Gardner 1985: 30). These arguments have 
been widely repeated, even in offi cial histories of the bank that 
suggest that “the distinction between developed and less de-
veloped and between north and south—the special problems 
of the ‘third’ world’—had scarcely swum into the ken of post-
war planners” (Mason and Asher 1973: 4). 
Scholarship on the origins of international development has 
reinforced these perspectives. Much of this literature suggests 
that modern concepts of international development were born 
with US President Harry Truman’s commitment in 1949 to em-
bark “on a bold new problem for making the benefi ts of our 
scientifi c advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (quoted in 
Rist 1997: 71). That speech is said to have given prominence to 
the term “underdevelopment” for the fi rst time and justifi ed 
US intervention in postcolonial contexts to address it. As  Esteva 
(1992: 7) puts it, “Underdevelopment began, then, on January 
20, 1949. On that day, two billion people became underdevel-
oped.” The history of Bretton Woods plays little role in these 
accounts of the birth of international development. 
I have argued elsewhere that new evidence makes these inter-
pretations diffi cult to defend (Helleiner 2014). Far from ignor-
ing development issues, many of the Bretton Woods architects 
were keenly interested in pioneering new international rules 
and institutions that could help support the economic develop-
ment of poorer countries. This was true of White and other top 
US policymakers involved in the Bretton Woods negotiations who 
explicitly incorporated modern conceptions of international 
development into US foreign policy during the negotiations 
(and even before, from the late 1930s in the inter-American 
context). It was also the case for many offi cials and analysts 
from poorer regions of the world such as China, Mexico, Brazil, 
and other Latin American countries. Here, I focus on the 
 Indian role in advocating for the inclusion of development is-
sues in the plans for the post-war international fi nancial order.1 
Indian Participation
Before turning to this issue, it is important to recall India’s 
unique status in the negotiations. All other governments par-
ticipating in the creation of the post-war international fi nan-
cial order represented independent countries, with the excep-
tion of the Philippines (although it had become a self-govern-
ing commonwealth in 1934 and had been promised independ-
ence by the US after the war). India was, however, still a British 
colony at this time and was thus represented by the British-run 
government of India during the Bretton Woods negotiations. 
On the fi rst day of the conference, the status of the Indian 
delegates was the subject of private discussion within the US 
delegation. Dean Acheson told his colleagues that “our atti-
tude is to treat them like a Dominion,” although he noted that 
“the degree of control which the British Government exercises, 
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or appears to exercise over India depends on what is going on. 
They can exercise a very high degree of control, or they can-
not, as they choose” (Morgenthau Diary, Book 749: 13–14). US 
offi cials had endorsed India’s participation in the negotiations 
to design the post-war international fi nancial order as far back 
as White’s fi rst plans in early 1942 because it had been one of 
26 signatories of the Declaration of the United Nations in January 
1942. In April 1943, India had also been included among the 37 
governments invited by White’s boss, US Treasury Secretary 
Henry Morgenthau, for consultations on White’s fi rst public 
draft of his proposals for an international Fund (US State 
Department 1948: 1573–74). 
At that time, the Indian government had already been con-
sulted by the British government about post-war international 
fi nancial plans in late 1942 and March 1943 (Van Dormael 
1978: 66; Simha 1970: 406–07). Initially, it had kept these con-
sultations with the British secret from the Indian public, but 
the government began to solicit broader public input after the 
Keynes and White plans were made public in April 1943. As 
noted below, many Indians subsequently expressed strong 
views about India’s role and interests in the negotiations, 
prompting the government to appoint a delegation to Bretton 
Woods that involved both Indian and British delegates. The 
situation prompted White to make the following private com-
ment to his colleagues on the fi rst day of the conference. 
The Indian delegation itself presents, nominally, a united front. Actually 
you have two groups. You have the pro-English group as well as the 
English advisers who are supposed to defend India’s position, and who 
will do so, nominally. You have, along with them—India has been able 
to get certain delegates who represent what they call the masses of In-
dians—they are not the British Government. So there are things going 
on even within their own representation which will make trouble 
(Morgenthau Diary, Book 749, 15). 
In practice, there appears to have been less strife within the 
Indian delegation than White anticipated. Although the British 
Finance Member Jeremy Raisman was chair of the delegation, 
he assigned the key role of representing India’s views at the 
conference to the Indian delegates. Chandavarkar (2001: 2652) 
argues that “Raisman’s role at Bretton Woods was the most 
unsordid act of leadership actuated by a deep sense of mission 
that India’s permanent interests were best served by Indian 
spokesmen.” Only on the issue of how hard India should press 
for a larger IMF quota did signifi cant tensions appear to 
emerge—and then only briefl y—between Raisman and the 
 Indian delegates (Deshmukh 1974: 128; Simha 1970: 433–34). 
Indian Comments on the Keynes and White Plans
Indian voices were thus clearly heard both before and during 
the conference despite India’s colonial status at the time. What 
did they call for? The fi rst substantial Indian input into the 
Bretton Woods planning process came in November 1943 from 
the board of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) whose views had 
been formally solicited by the government in August (Simha 1970: 
407–14). At the time, the RBI’s role in presenting Indian opin-
ion was important; Chintaman Deshmukh had been appointed 
the RBI’s fi rst Indian governor in August and a majority of its 12 
voting directors were Indians elected by the shareholders of 
the bank. As Chandavarkar (1983: 795) notes, “The resignation 
of the Congress ministries in the provinces and the absence of 
the Congress Party from the legislatures thrust upon the central 
board of the Reserve Bank the role of the only elected or repre-
sentative trustees of India’s economic and monetary interests.” 
The RBI board’s commentary highlighted the priority its 
members gave to development goals. Earlier in February, it had 
already passed a resolution recommending that the govern-
ment prepare a full plan for India’s post-war economic devel-
opment. Deshmukh himself also had become convinced of 
what he called in early 1945 “the imperious necessity of plan-
ning, of the assumption of direct initiative by the State for a 
vast effort of development and amelioration” (1945: 17; 1974: 
167–69). In its comments, the RBI board noted that India’s atti-
tude was “bound to be conditioned by special factors such as 
its economic backwardness, its appalling poverty, its dismally 
low standard of living and its just aspirations to make up the 
long leeway in industrial and agricultural development.” If 
international plans were to be acceptable to poorer countries 
such as India, the board argued that they should include 
among their major goals “the making of conscious efforts to 
raise the standard of living in these countries, although such 
efforts might temporarily mean a standing-still in the more ad-
vanced countries” (quoted in Simha 1970: 415–16). 
The board also made a case that poorer countries such as 
China and India needed greater policy space to adjust exchange 
rates to insulate their domestic economies from sudden balance 
of payments problems caused by changes in agricultural prices 
(Simha 1970: 417). The argument refl ected India’s experience 
during the Great Depression when the Indian exchange rate 
policy had become highly politicised. Despite sharp declines in 
the prices of India’s agricultural exports, the colonial govern-
ment had refused to devalue the rupee against sterling in the 
early 1930s. The resulting severe contraction had generated 
widespread demands from Indian business leaders and nation-
alists for both devaluation and expansionary monetary policy 
aimed at supporting domestic industrial growth (Mukherjee 
2002: ch 4; Tomlinson 1979: 73–75, 78, 131; Deshmukh 1944a: 
96). The British fi nance member in mid-1931 had even ac-
knowledged that the government’s currency policy was “one 
of the most important factors in the whole anti-British political 
movement” (quoted in Mukherjee 2002: 103).
In addition to soliciting the RBI’s views, the government invited 
broader Indian views on the post-war plans to be expressed 
through a new high-level General Policy Committee of the Re-
construction Committee of Council that had representatives from 
the Government of India, provincial governments, and Indian 
states as well as non-offi cial members. Records from the National 
Archives of India show that the fi rst meeting of the committee 
in January 1944 was a lively affair. Raisman opened the meeting 
by noting that the government had “not yet undertaken the 
formulation of its offi cial views of the merits of either plan 
[British or US], still less committed itself in any way.” But he 
noted that a position needed to be taken soon and the committee’s 
creation was important to this process. “Whatever view may 
 ultimately be taken by the Government of India of these problems, 
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it is clearly desirable that it should take cognisance of public 
opinion and in order that public opinion be informed, organised 
discussion is desirable” (General Policy Committee 1944: 4). 
While Indian members of the committee appreciated the 
chance to provide input, they asked quite pointed questions about 
process. For example, R K Shanmukham Chetty, who had pre-
viously represented India at a number of international confer-
ences, asked for assurance that the government would serve 
India’s interests in the international negotiations without being 
dictated to by Britain. When Raisman gave this promise, some 
participants, such as Hoosain Imam, “wanted a further assur-
ance that he would be guided not by the opinions of Indians 
who were in the Government, but by the opinion of those who 
were outside the Government” (General Policy Committee 
1944: 16). Jamnadas Mehta also “wondered why Indian experts 
were not called upon to advise when the Keynes and the White 
plans were being prepared, why there was no Indian plan 
ready and why India was simply asked to consider what other 
countries had put forward” (General Policy Committee 1944: 10).
Indians at the meeting also echoed the RBI’s comments 
about the need to prioritise development goals and the distinct 
needs of poorer countries such as India. For example, Chetty 
argued, “In evaluating these schemes, the main consideration 
to be kept in mind was how far they would enable us to raise 
the standard of life of our own people in India by increasing 
employment and by increasing the national wealth of the 
country.” He continued, 
Unfortunately for us when the European or the American countries 
spoke in the past of standards of living, they were thinking purely of 
the security of the standard of living of their own people. Sometimes 
in a mood of generosity and internationalism, they spoke of raising 
the standard of life of the vast millions of Asiatics, but if their state-
ments were closely analysed it was always found that their anxiety for 
the raising of the standard of life of Asia was to ensure a better market 
for their own products and to expand their own domestic production. 
If international discussions were to take place on such a plane in fu-
ture, it would be absolutely impossible to arrive at any rational inter-
national action (General Policy Committee 1944: 15). 
Development Priorities
Development priorities were also highlighted by Ardeshir 
Darabshaw Shroff, director of Tata Sons, who had been associated 
with the nationalist wing of the Bombay business community and 
was one of the authors of the “Bombay Plan” published the same 
month (Thakurdas et el 1944; Markovits 1985). Prepared by 
eight prominent Indian businessmen, the plan outlined an am-
bitious development strategy for doubling India’s per capita in-
come within 15 years through state-led industrialisation. It 
 attracted much attention in nationalist circles and was even 
backed by the British Viceroy (despite being criticised privately by 
the government’s Economic Adviser, Theodore Gregory) (Loka-
na than 1945; Rothermund 1993: 125). In the General Policy 
Committee, Shroff invoked the goals outlined in the Bombay Plan. 
The main test to be applied to any plan was: whether the acceptance of 
such a plan would impede the progress of the economic development 
of this country to a stage where the masses of the people would 
possess the minimum purchasing power and a standard of living 
which was considered to be the minimum for the people of the coun-
try? If the economic development of the country was to be on a scale 
commensurate with the growing expectations of the people and if the 
minimum standard of living desired by the people during the next 10 
to 15 years was at least to be doubled, then it would be necessary for 
India to adopt an expansionist policy. The question therefore was 
whether the demand for an expansionist policy for this country would 
be accepted in any of the international plans. If such a policy were go-
ing to be hindered by the acceptance of any international plan, India 
should refuse to be party to it (General Policy Committee 1944: 12). 
Indian participants also emphasised that India and other 
poorer countries should receive special treatment because of 
their development needs. As N R Sarkar put it, 
Countries like India and China with a large population and a compara-
tively low standard of life should be given special considerations in any 
international plan ... Any special concession given to her or to China 
for improving their standards of life would contribute as much towards 
the advancement of those countries as to the success and stability of the 
world monetary organisation (General Policy Committee 1944: 10).
One of the special considerations India needed, Sarkar 
argued, was policy space to adjust its exchange rate.
With the tremendous task of building up the entire industrial and agri-
cultural structure from its very foundations, India could not but follow 
an expansionist monetary policy, safeguarding, at the same time, the 
domestic price and income levels. It followed therefore that the main-
tenance of domestic prices at a reasonable level would be of far more 
importance to India than the maintenance of stable exchange rates 
(General Policy Committee 1944: 9). 
Sarkar also felt India should be allowed to use tariffs and for-
eign exchange rationing to protect and strengthen local industry. 
Trade Issues
Trade issues had also been raised a week earlier in the fi rst 
meeting of a “Finance Sub-committee” of the Consultative 
Committee of Economists of the Reconstruction Committee that 
had discussed the Keynes and White’s plans. Chaired by Gregory 
and including a number of Indian economists, this subcommittee 
had discussed the “right to levy protective tariffs and to adopt 
measures of control for general development.” It had concluded 
that neither the White nor Keynes plan was clear on this issue 
and it “agreed that the acceptance of any international scheme 
by India should not restrict her freedom to levy development 
tariffs or to adopt any other measures for economic develop-
ment.” On exchange rate policy, the subcommittee also noted 
that it “was not in favour of the gold standard of the orthodox 
type” (External Affairs Department 1944: 2).
From the Joint Statement to Bretton Woods
The Government of India solicited even wider input from 
Indians in the wake of the April 1944 publication of the Anglo–
American “Joint Statement by Experts,” which outlined draft 
plans for the IMF. In addition to soliciting the views of the RBI, 
the General Policy Committee and the Consultative Committee 
of Economists, the government circulated copies of the joint 
statement to provincial governments and chambers of commerce 
across India (Finance Department 1944a). Interestingly, the 
extent of this effort at local consultation was greater than 
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within most other countries participating in the Bretton 
Woods negotiations at this time.
One of the fi rst detailed comments was provided on 4 May 
1944 by the RBI’s senior economist J V Joshi. He objected to the 
omission of any reference to sterling balances as well as to 
the inclusion of a transitional period when India would be 
“completely at the mercy of the United Kingdom” (Joshi 1944: 
17). But Joshi was more positive about the provisions allowing 
countries to adjust exchange rates when they were in “funda-
mental disequilibrium” (and preventing the fund from oppos-
ing requests for adjustments because of the “domestic social or 
political policies of the country applying for a change;” see 
Horsefi eld 1969: 133). Recalling the RBI’s earlier comments, he 
noted that exchange rate fl exibility was important because “an 
agricultural country like India is likely to have violent fl uctua-
tions in her balance of payments position if agricultural prices 
decrease catastrophically as was our experience in the pre-war 
decade” (Joshi 1944: 8). He also made a broader point. 
We desire freedom to change the par value of the rupee on the ground 
that India’s economic plans, such as the development of her industrial 
and agricultural resources may introduce such disequilibrium in her 
balance of payments position which can only be effectively and appro-
priately corrected by a depreciation of the exchange value of the ru-
pee. In such circumstances, the fund should not be in a position to 
prohibit such devaluation. This non-interference of the fund in the in-
ternal economic policies of a country is secured by the provision under 
this clause (Joshi 1944: 9).
Joshi was also quite positive about the inclusion of the follow-
ing wording that described the purposes of the fund in the Joint 
Statement—“to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth 
of international trade and to contribute in this way to the 
maintenance of a high level of employment and of real income 
which must be a primary objective of economic policy.” Joshi 
argued that the endorsement of the maintenance of “high level of 
employment and of real income” in the fund’s purposes refl ected 
an acceptance “in an indirect way” of the RBI’s earlier comments. 
“If backward countries like India and China are to have ‘a high 
level of employment and of real income’, it is inevitable that their 
economic development must be secured by the policies of the 
International Monetary Fund. We may, therefore, welcome this 
clause as a tacit acceptance of the proposal made by us regarding 
the economic development of backward countries like India 
and China.” But he recommended that it might be worth con-
sidering whether it was necessary to make the objective “per-
fectly clear” through the addition of a separate clause that 
stated “that one of the objects of the fund will be to help in the 
industrial and agricultural development of backward coun-
tries in order to raise their standards of living” (Joshi 1944: 2). 
After the RBI board discussed the Joint Statement on 11 May, 
Deshmukh wrote a memo to the government which repeated 
Joshi’s suggestion that development priorities be stated more 
explicitly in the fund’s purposes.
No international economic co-operation worth the name will succeed 
and lay the foundation for enduring international peace and prosperity 
unless the retarded development of important units like India and 
China receive special recognition and treatment. In the absence of any 
such recognition and treatment, international machinery, with the 
inevitable preponderance of the representation of the more advanced 
countries, is apt only to serve as a stalking horse for selfi sh national 
policies on behalf of such countries at the behest of powerful vested 
interests and under the guise of plausible economic theories about the 
division of international labour. In concrete terms, and as an illustra-
tion, countries like India are apt to be relegated to the production of 
primary commodities in the interests of maintaining full employment 
in advanced manufacturing countries (quoted in Simha 1970: 421–22).
The RBI’s views on the Joint Statement were not dissimilar to 
those presented by other Indians in response to the government’s 
call for public input. In a memo of 23 June 1944 summarising 
the public comments, an offi cial noted that “the consensus of 
opinion is in favour of India participating in the scheme,” but 
that “non-offi cial opinion” was concerned about issues such as 
sterling balances, India’s quota size, and the need for India to 
be completely free to fi x its exchange rate. The offi cial also 
noted that respondents had noted that “the fund should specifi -
cally recognise that one of its purposes is to promote internal 
national development, particularly that of the backward coun-
tries” (Nehru 1944: 1). 
At the same time that it was soliciting Indian opinion about 
the Joint Statement, the government began to discuss the 
composition of the Indian delegation being sent to the Bretton 
Woods conference. The initial plan had been to include 
Raisman, Gregory, and Deshmukh, but the issue was made 
more complicated by a meeting on 4–5 May of the General Policy 
Committee where demands had been made that the delegation 
include non-offi cial members because of India’s political situa-
tion (Merrell 1944). One of the authors of the Bombay Plan, 
Purshottamdas Thakurdas, was then approached, but he could 
not travel to the US for medical reasons and he suggested 
Shroff in his place, a suggestion that Deshmukh endorsed on 
8 May 1944 (Deshmukh 1944b). Raisman agreed the next day, 
but an invitation had already been extended to Chetty after an 
earlier conversation, and Chetty had accepted immediately. In 
this context, Raisman endorsed the idea of Shroff as a second 
non-offi cial delegate and Shroff accepted (Finance Department 
1944b). A British offi cial later reported that “Raisman had told 
me that it was felt necessary that the Indian delegation should 
include at least one person with strong nationalist views and 
Shroff was ‘nominated’ by nationalist interests” (Eady 1944: 1). 
The delegation was then rounded out with David Meek 
(Indian Trade Commissioner in London, serving as an adviser), A 
A Henderson (assistant adviser), and the RBI’s Director of 
Research, B K Madan (who acted as the delegation’s secretary). 
Inner Circle of Governments
India was then one of an inner circle of 16 governments invited 
to a meeting at Atlantic City in June 1944 that hammered out 
the agenda for the Bretton Woods conference. The British had 
pushed for India’s inclusion in this meeting, arguing that it 
would help build support for the fund in India (British Foreign 
Offi ce 1944a: 1). White was initially opposed on the grounds 
that the US had already agreed to the participation of Australia 
and Canada and that it would be diffi cult to justify to the 
American public the inclusion of so many “British Empire” 
countries (Morgenthau Diary, Book 740: 84). But he fi nally 
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 relented in exchange for the addition of two more countries 
from the Americas (British Foreign Offi ce 1944b). Raisman, 
Gregory, and Deshmukh represented India at Atlantic City. 
The rest of the delegates representing India then arrived for 
the Bretton Woods conference, which started on 1 July. The 
delegation was headed formally by Raisman rather than one 
of the Indians, a situation which Chetty and Shroff described 
to the Times of India after the conference as “embarrassing 
and humiliating.” But as noted earlier, Raisman delegated the 
role of representing India’s views at the meeting to the Indian 
delegates and both Chetty and Shroff acknowledged that 
“Raisman’s support of Indian members of the delegation was 
admirable” (quotes from Chandavarkar 2001: 2652). In their 
leading role, the Indian representatives impressed other delegates; 
for example, Keynes singled out Deshmukh’s performance for 
praise and Brazil’s fi nance minister told a Brazilian audience 
after the meeting that India had “brilliant representation” 
(quoted in Helleiner 2014: 250; for Keynes, see Chandavarkar 
2001: 2652). The Indian delegates focused at the conference 
partly on the issues of India’s quota and voting power as well 
as the sterling balance. Here I want to focus on the way that 
they also insisted that the Bretton Woods system be supportive 
of the development goals of India and other poorer countries.
Indian Push for Development
At the Atlantic City meeting, the Indian delegation had already 
succeeded in including a proposed amendment to the state-
ment of the IMF’s purposes for discussion at Bretton Woods. 
The amendment was to the phrase that Joshi had identifi ed 
and it involved the following:
To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade, to assist in the fuller utilisation of the resources of economically 
underdeveloped countries and to contribute thereby to the mainte-
nance in the world as a whole of a high level of employment and real 
income, which must be a primary objective of economic policy (US 
State Department 1948: 23; emphasis in the original). 
At the Bretton Woods conference, Raisman justifi ed the 
proposal to the committee drafting the IMF’s purposes on the 
following grounds, “[the wording of the Joint Statement] gives 
undue emphasis to the high level of income and of employ-
ment in already highly industrial countries…The fund should 
have as its objective also to bring low-income countries up to a 
high level quite as much as to maintain the high level in other 
countries” (Schuler and Rosenberg 2012: 306).
The inclusion of the word “underdeveloped” in this Indian 
proposal is noteworthy for historians of international deve-
lopment. While many scholars attribute this word’s fi rst promi-
nence to Truman’s 1949 speech, here it was appearing at a 
major international conference fi ve years before Truman’s 
speech. And the word was being introduced for a very different 
reason than that attributed to Truman. Rather than being used to 
justify US intervention in postcolonial contexts, the Indian dele-
gation employed it as part of its demand for greater international 
support for India’s state-led development goals. Moreover, far 
from endorsing the word, the US chose at this moment to 
 oppose the inclusion of this phrase in the IMF’s charter. 
The US concern was that this new wording might have the 
effect of confusing the fund’s purposes with the development 
mandate of the IBRD. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, 
Brazil, and South Africa, also expressed this concern immedi-
ately. Some other delegations, however, supported the Indian 
proposal, such as Ecuador and Australia (although the latter 
suggested dropping the word “thereby,” to which India agreed). 
Peru’s Pedro Beltrán was also sympathetic, but suggested that 
India’s concerns might be addressed instead by adding the 
words “promote and maintain” in front of “high levels of full 
employment and real income,” a suggestion that quickly 
gained support (Schuler and Rosenberg 2012: 304–07).
The issue was then referred to a small drafting committee, 
which came up with the following new wording by the next 
day. “To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of inter-
national trade and to contribute thereby to the promotion and 
maintenance of a high level of employment and to the develop-
ment of the sources of productive power in all member coun-
tries as primary objectives of economic policy” (Schuler and 
Rosenberg 2012: 328–30). The choice of the phrase “productive 
power” was interesting since it seemed to invoke the kind of 
developmental language of 19th century economic nationalist 
Friedrich List. When discussion resumed on the issue on 6 July 
1944, Walter Nash of New Zealand asked the precise meaning 
of the phrase and suggested in its place the word “unused 
resources.” But China’s Tingfu Tsiang (who had a PhD in his-
tory from Columbia University) reported that the drafting 
committee had already considered and rejected those words 
“since they implied capitalistic development.” Brazil’s Eugênio 
Gudin added that “unused resources” were words that “implied 
investment and were appropriate for the bank,” while Greece’s 
Kyriakos Varvaressos noted that the drafting committee’s 
wording was “more comprehensive” than Nash’s suggestion 
(Schuler and Rosenberg 2012: 347). 
The drafting committee’s report was subsequently approved, 
although Chetty noted that the Indian delegation was not fully 
satisfi ed and reserved the right to object later. When the issue 
was discussed in the larger “Commission 1” that was drafting 
the IMF’s articles of agreement as a whole on 14 July 1944, 
Chetty proposed adding to the statement the following fi nal 
phrase—“with due regard to the needs of economically back-
ward countries” (US State Department 1948: 184). In a state-
ment released to the press, he argued that the explicit refer-
ence to “economically backward countries” was needed to 
make sure that the commitment to the “balanced growth of 
international trade” was not interpreted narrowly just to mean 
“an increase in the volume of trade which is about equal in re-
spect of exports and imports so as to avoid disequilibrium in 
the international balance of payments.” As he put it, 
We attach great importance also to the balanced character and com-
position of international trade. A predominant fl ow of raw materials 
and food stuffs in one direction and highly manufactured goods in the 
other direction is not a really balanced international trade from this 
latter point of view. It is only by greater attention to the industrial needs 
of countries like India that you can achieve a real and rational balance. It 
is for this reason that the India Delegation wants to mention specifi -
cally the needs of economically backward countries, in the description 
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of objectives of economic policy, which the fund cannot directly assist 
but may indirectly facilitate (US State Department 1948: 1180-81). 
Chetty added one further comment to his offi cial statement,
Our experience in the past has shown that international organisations 
have tended to approach all problems from the point of view of the 
advanced countries of the West. We want to insure that the new 
 organisation which we are trying to create will avoid this narrow out-
look and give due consideration to the economic problems of countries 
like India (US State Department 1948: 1181). 
The recently published detailed minutes of the meeting note 
that Chetty ended his speech by noting “the psychological 
value” of his proposal. “If these words are there in a charter of 
the international body that we are setting up, less advanced 
countries will then have greater hopes of the possibilities of 
economic development than they were led to believe in the 
past” (Schuler and Rosenberg 2012: 130).
UK’s Dennis Robertson replied with the following comment, 
“We are all in sympathy with those aspirations. Some of us 
have them very much at heart, but I would urge our Indian 
friends to refl ect at this late hour whether those aspirations are 
not better satisfi ed in the framework of the preambles of the 
bank than in the framework of the preambles of the fund.” 
He even noted that he and others had already been working 
on a clause of the bank’s charter, which he felt “fully covers the 
aspirations which have been so eloquently expressed by the 
last speaker” (US State Department 1948: 130). The issue was 
referred to a special committee, which recommended the 
following wording the next day.
To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of 
high levels of employment and real income and to the development of 
the sources of productive power in the territories of all members what-
ever stages of their economic development as primary objectives of 
economic policy (US State Department 1948: 697). 
When the issue came back to the commission that afternoon, 
the US, backed by Brazil, advanced yet one more new proposal 
that changed the wording slightly, including the removal 
of reference to “the sources of productive powers.” The new 
proposal read as follows, 
To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of 
high levels of employment and real income and to the development of 
the productive resources of all member countries as primary objec-
tives of economic policy (Schuler and Rosenberg 2012: 130, 190–91).
The Indian delegation objected to the new proposal and the 
issue was returned to the special committee once more. When 
the committee unanimously approved the wording suggested 
by the US on 18 July, however, White quickly moved the issue to a 
vote, where it passed (Schuler and Rosenberg 2012: 244–47). 
Broader Support for International Development
One “no” vote is recorded in the minutes, presumably that 
of India. It is noteworthy, however, that at least some “yes” 
votes were cast with deep sympathy for the Indian position. 
For example, just before the vote was taken, the chair of the 
Columbian delegation, Carlos Lleras Restrepo (who later became 
president of his country), made a formal statement that was 
released to the press endorsing the committee’s recommenda-
tion on the grounds that it “harmonises the technical orienta-
tion of the fund, the resources of which are to be used solely to 
provide foreign exchange for current transactions, with the 
desire of the delegation from India to include among the ulti-
mate purposes of the new facilities for the growth of inter-
national trade the development of the means of production of 
the member countries” (US State Department 1948: 1185). 
The Columbian delegate went on to argue that the wording 
implied recognition of “the right of new nations whose re-
sources are not suffi ciently developed to move forward on the 
road which they have already started to travel toward a more 
complex economy, toward a growing industrialisation which 
may alter, and probably will alter, the volume of international 
trade in many commodities.” To reinforce the point, he added 
the following comment about future trade agreements. 
They must not be conceived in such a way that they will become obstacles 
to the necessary protection which must be given in the new countries to 
their infant industries, as was given at one time by today’s industrial 
countries to their own industries during their fi rst steps in industrial de-
velopment. It is necessary that the conference understand that our as-
sent to a policy of greater trade and greater freedom of exchange for 
current transactions is given in a spirit of broad concept of international 
cooperation, which could never be based on the idea that this broaden-
ing process could be contrary to the development of our own domestic 
production and to the integration of our economy through a steady ac-
cess to new industrial techniques (US State Department 1948: 1186).
It is noteworthy that White responded to this speech by 
noting that it was “a splendid statement in support of the 
recommendation” (Schuler and Rosenberg 2012: 247). White’s 
comments were likely very genuine. He had included strong 
statements about the importance of infant industry protection 
in poorer countries in his early drafts of the Bretton Woods 
plans and he was strongly supportive of state-led development 
strategies in poorer countries. He had designed the IBRD 
explicitly to mobilise lending to support development in 
poorer countries and he saw the IMF as an institution that 
would help support state-led development both through its 
lending activities and its provision of policy space through the 
endorsement of capital controls and adjustable exchange rates 
(Helleiner 2014). 
White’s views on these issues were widely shared in US 
policymaking circles at the time, including by President Franklin 
Roosevelt himself who was strongly committed to the idea of 
raising living standards in poorer regions of the world through 
international support (Helleiner 2014: 119–20). US Treasury 
Secretary Morgenthau had even reiterated that commitment in 
his opening speech to the Bretton Woods conference, “Prosperity, 
like peace, is indivisible. We cannot afford to have it scattered 
here or there among the fortunate or to enjoy it at the expense 
of others. Poverty, wherever it exists, is menacing to us all and 
undermines the well-being of each of us” (US State Department 
1948: 81). In a high-profi le article in Foreign Affairs in early 
1945, Morgenthau (1945: 190) had gone out of his way to stress 
how the Bretton Woods framework was designed to meet not 
just developed countries’ goals but also the objectives of less 
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developed countries to raise their levels of industrialisation 
and standards of living.
The Bretton Woods approach is based on the realisation that it is to the 
economic and political advantage of countries such as India and China, 
and also of countries such as England and the United States, that the in-
dustrialisation and betterment of living conditions in the former be 
achieved with the aid and encouragement of the latter.
For these reasons, it is important not to interpret—as some 
have done—the fate of India’s proposals as a lack of interest at 
Bretton Woods in prioritising the development of poorer 
countries. It simply refl ected a worry that the IMF’s mandate 
might expand too much and overlap with that of the bank (and 
that India’s proposed wording might be also used to force the 
fund to address sterling balances; Eckes 1975: 148–49). Those 
concerns were shared not just by US offi cials but also by dele-
gates from many Latin American countries who were just as 
committed to international development goals as were their 
Indian counterparts. It is also important to note that the fi nal 
wording of the IMF’s purposes could still be interpreted—as it 
was by the Columbian delegate—as supportive of develop-
ment objectives. And as noted above, the provisions in the 
IMF’s charter allowing the use of exchange rate adjustments 
and capital controls were seen by US policymakers at the 
time—as well as by Indians, Latin Americans and Chinese—as 
providing policy space not just for wealthy countries to protect 
social security and Keynesian full employment policies, but 
also for poorer countries to pursue state-led development 
strategies (Helleiner 2014). 
 Even more important was that the Indian initiative helped 
encourage the IBRD’s development mandate to be strengthened at 
the conference, as was highlighted by Robertson’s comments to 
Chetty noted above. The fi nal version of the IBRD’s charter did 
what the Indian delegation had hoped for in the IMF debate—it 
made an explicit reference to the development needs of “less 
developed countries.” This had been missing from the initial 
Anglo–American proposal emerging from the Atlantic City 
meeting where the IBRD’s purposes had included phrases such 
as assisting “in the reconstruction and development of member 
countries” and “encouraging international investment for the 
development of the productive resources of member countries” 
(US State Department 1948: 366–67). At the Bretton Woods 
conference, the bank’s fi rst purpose was redrafted as follows.
To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of 
members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive pur-
poses, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted 
by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime 
needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facili-
ties and resources in less developed countries (US State Department 
1948: 1049–50; emphasis added).
The bank’s general loan provisions were also drafted at 
Bretton Woods in a way that the institution was required to 
give “equitable consideration to projects for development and 
projects for reconstruction alike.” This specifi c wording had 
been proposed by Keynes, but it emerged from an initiative of 
Mexican offi cials who were concerned that the bank might pri-
oritise reconstruction lending over development lending. The 
new wording was strongly supported by the US, Britain, Brazil 
and other Latin American countries (Schuler and Rosenberg 
2012: 528–30). India also backed it forcefully; indeed, Desh-
mukh had been nominated as chair of one of the committees 
developing the IBRD’s charter and he worked together with 
Latin American delegates on this issue (Eckes 1975: 156; Simha 
1970: 426–27; Morgenthau Diary, Book 755: 208). He and other 
Indians saw the IBRD as a source of useful development 
fi nance to support India’s ambitious post-war development 
strategies (Deshmukh 1944a; Simha 1972: 48).
Given all this, it is easy to understand why Indian delegates 
called attention after the conference to the development focus 
of the Bretton Woods agreements. For example, in a speech in 
London in 1945, Shroff invoked Morgenthau’s opening speech 
about poverty in discussing the purposes of Bretton Woods 
and he noted that one of the goals of the IMF was “to see that 
the economically backward countries got suitable opportunities 
for rapid development, and that a substantial increase in the 
standard of living and real income of the people is brought 
about” (Shroff 1945: 50). After the conference, Deshmukh 
(1945: 2–3) also highlighted the development orientation of 
Bretton Woods in a speech to an Indian audience. His words 
are worth quoting at length.
The intervening depression taught economists and political thinkers, 
and even statesmen, more about production and destruction of wealth 
than two centuries of economic teaching and there may be said to 
exist today, at least in theory, a more vivid realisation of the causes of 
poverty and plenty and economic and political friction than at any 
other time before in the world’s history. We all now apparently sub-
scribe to the belief that poverty and plenty are infectious, in the inter-
national as well as in the national fi eld, and that we cannot hope to 
keep our own side of the garden pretty if our neighbour’s is full of 
weeds … Whether this newly acquired vision will endure and endow 
international collaboration with sincerity of purpose remains to be 
seen; but, for countries like ours, which have suffered much from pro-
gressive economic maladjustment due to political and other causes 
throughout our long history, the awareness of international obliga-
tions, the signs of which we see all round us, is a good omen and an 
excellent stimulus to planning for wealth and welfare. In this connec-
tion a particularly encouraging fact is that the importance of the 
development of backward countries appears to be gaining increasing 
recognition. Even in highly industrialised countries, with large vested 
interests in world markets, the realisation has been borne in all think-
ing sections of the populations that poor customers are never good 
customers and that the setting up of industries in mainly agricultural 
countries together with an improvement in their agricultural produc-
tion, does not represent a challenge to the industrialised countries. 
Although the Indian delegation to Bretton Woods conference failed to 
get this thought embodied among the purposes of the International 
Monetary Fund, in the draft agreement relating to the International 
Bank on Reconstruction and Development we did succeed in getting it 
included as among the economic goals of all nations. 
Conclusions
These statements by Shroff and Deshmukh help to show how 
participants in the Bretton Woods conference recognised its 
signifi cance in advancing new concepts of international 
development at the time. This point deserves underlining, 
given how many scholars have downplayed this feature of the 
Bretton Woods conference. Rather than neglecting develop-
ment issues, the Bretton Woods architects pioneered the 
creation of a new kind of international fi nancial order that 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  July 18, 2015 vol l no 29 39
was designed to be supportive of state-led industrialisation 
and development goals of poorer countries for the fi rst time. 
Five years before Truman called for technical and fi nancial as-
sistance to address underdevelopment, the Bretton Woods ar-
chitects outlined a much more ambitious template for interna-
tional development that included the creation of the IBRD and 
support for policy space to enable poorer countries to pursue 
state-led development strategies.
These development aspirations embodied in the Bretton 
Woods agreements have been overlooked by much scholarship 
for a simple reason—they were largely abandoned by US 
policymakers after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945. This is not 
the place to analyse this dramatic shift in US foreign policy, but 
its impact was to make the “actually-existing” Bretton Woods 
system much less supportive of state-led development strategies 
than had initially been intended. That support was eroded further 
when the Bretton Woods institutions became leading advocates 
of neo-liberal policy advice later in the post-war period. Despite 
these transformations, the original intentions of the Bretton 
Woods architects deserve to be remembered, particularly today 
when emerging powers such as India, China, and Brazil are call-
ing for a more development-friendly international fi nancial 
 order. Those calls are often perceived as challenges to the Bret-
ton Woods system. In fact, they are resurrecting its original goals. 
It is also worth recalling that those goals were ones that 
 India, China, and Brazil helped to establish through their ac-
tive participation in the Bretton Woods negotiations. The Bret-
ton Woods negotiations are usually depicted as primarily an 
Anglo–American affair, but individuals from these coun-
tries—as well as many others—were deeply engaged in the 
process. Like Chinese and Brazilian participants, Indians 
played a particularly interesting role in raising the profi le of 
development issues in the discussions. That role deserves 
greater recognition not just because it helped to shape the fi nal 
Bretton Woods agreements. It also served to foreshadow the 
role that contemporary Indian policymakers and those from 
other emerging powers are playing today in debates about the 
future of the Bretton Woods institutions.
Note
1  Although I do not focus here on sterling bal-
ance issue, it is worth noting that Indian dele-
gates at Bretton Woods cast it in development 
terms as well, arguing that the frozen nature of 
balances constrained India from launching ini-
tiatives to raise its standard of living (US State 
Department 1948: 426, 1173).
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